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8.1  Introduction: Japan’s Postwar Development Experience and Its 
Influence on Japan’s Aid Policy 
An  objective of this paper is to explain the characteristics of Japan’s official 
development assistance (ODA) and the philosophy behind it. Special attention 
will be paid to the question of  whether Japan’s ODA is actually intended to 
foster the growth and development of recipient countries or whether it is moti- 
vated by the commercial goal of Japanese export promotion. I will outline the 
characteristics  of Japan’s ODA program and its impact on East Asian countries 
and put forward the contention that Japan’s aid philosophy is based on its own 
development experience. 
The Japanese ODA program started in 1954 when Japan joined the Colombo 
Plan, and the ODA loan program started in 1958. At that time Japan faced 
constraints on its balance of payments and export expansion was crucially im- 
portant; all ODA loans were tied loans intended to promote Japan’s exports to 
developing countries. This aim is clearly mentioned in the government docu- 
ment describing the program (Ministry of  International Trade and Industry 
[MITI] 1959,129). 
As it was starting its ODA program, Japan borrowed money from the World 
Bank throughout the 1950s, and even in the early 1960s. World Bank loans 
to Japan were for infrastructure and basic industry investments as shown in 
table 8.1. 
I believe that the experience of economic development and the development 
policy in postwar Japan has had a substantial influence on Japan’s aid policy. 
The connection is not direct but is important in determining the Japanese gov- 
ernment’s basic aid policy. 
Hirohisa Kohama is professor of economics at University of Shizuoka. 
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Table 8.1  World Bank Loans to Japan 
Year  Project 
Loan 



















Machine tools for car plant 
Ship engine plant 
Ship engine plant 
Steel plant 
Agricultural land development 

































































Source: World Bank (1991, 114-17). 
Many observers outside Japan argue that the Japanese government, in partic- 
ular the MITI, played a crucial role in the rapid industrialization and export 
expansion in postwar Japan. It is true that the Japanese government (in particu- 
lar the MITI) implemented various postwar industrial and export promotion 
policy measures. For a comprehensive analysis of Japan’s industrial policy, see 203  Japan’s Development Cooperation and Economic Development in East Asia 
Table 8.2  Investment Financing by Source in Postwar 
Japan (%) 
~~  ~~ 
1952-54  1955-59  1960-64  1965-67 
Bank loans  52.2  62.1  63.5  73.5 
Government loans  28.4  20.5  15.0  16.8 
Bond  5.6  3.4  5.6  5.5 
Stock  13.8  14.1  15.9  4.1 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Kodama (1994). 
Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura (1988) and Itoh et al. (1991). However, the 
MITI did not always lead the private sector, and private companies did not 
always respond as the MITI expected. Relevant anecdotes on Japan’s industrial 
policy are presented in Ohkawa and Kohama (1989, chap. 8). 
The most important factor in explaining Japan’s rapid economic growth was 
not industrial policy but the dynamism of the private sector and the limited 
role played by  the government. Industrial policy was  successful only when 
it assisted the efficiency-oriented management of the economy based on the 
dynamism of the private sector, or, in other words, the market mechanism. The 
Japanese government simply provided the basic infrastructure and a competi- 
tive economic environment. This is the secret of  Japan’s postwar economic 
success. 
In order to realize the above-mentioned private initiatives, political stability, 
continuity of economic policy, and provision of basic infrastructure are indis- 
pensable. Table 8.2 shows investment financing by  source. This table shows 
that the weight of government loans for investment was less than 20 percent 
during the postwar rapid growth period. Moreover government loans for fi- 
nancing manufacturing investment were relatively small compared with the 
government loans for infrastructure and mining (table 8.3). These figures indi- 
cate that government loans, one of the major tools of industrial policy, were 
used indirectly for industrialization through the provision of public goods. I 
think this fact is very important in understanding the role of government in the 
process of economic development. 
In the following section, the characteristics of Japan’s ODA are outlined. In 
section 8.3, economic cooperation with East Asia and the expansion of Japan’s 
ODA are discussed. In section 8.4,  I will outline my view of East Asian dyna- 
mism, and the role of  development cooperation is presented. Major conclu- 
sions are summarized in the final section. 204  Hirohisa Kohama 
Table 8.3  Allocation of Government Loans for Investment in Postwar 
Japan (%I 
1952-54  1955-59  1960-64  1964-67 
Allocarion for Invesrment 
Agriculture  18.5  15.3 
Mining  3.8  4.0 
Manufacturing  n.a.  22.8 
Electricity/gas/water  41.1  33.0 
Transportationkommunication  17.5  14.4 
Others  6.1  10.4 
Total  100.0  100.0 
13.8  15.0 
4.8  4.8 
31.7  27.1 
15.9  5.9 
20.0  21.7 
13.7  18.8 
100.0  100.0 
Relarive Share of Allocarion for Invesfmenr 
Agriculture  74.6  72.0  92.9  111.6 
Mining  120.3  172.8  339.5  468.6 
Manufacturing  71.8  78.3  94.4  85.1 
Infrastructure’  590.3  445.6  321.4  323.9 
Others  n.a.  28.4  35.1  44.3 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Kodama (1994). 
Nore: Relative share is the raito of allocation of government loans for investment (data in panel 
A) to value-added share of each setor. 
“Electricity/gas/water/transportation/communication, 
8.2  Japan’s ODA and Its Characteristics 
8.2.1  A Motif of ODA Policy 
The officially stated principle of ODA has undergone substantial changes 
over time depending on the economic status and condition of Japan. As men- 
tioned in section 8.1, the purpose of extending ODA loans in the late 1950s 
was to promote Japan’s exports. Later, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Japanese 
government stated only two aid principles, those of  “humanitarian consider- 
ation” and  “recognition of  interdependence” (Ministry of  Foreign Affairs 
1990, 25-27).  These two aid principles were too broad, however, and tanta- 
mount to no principle at all. Moreover, it seems that Japan’s aid is not always 
derived from a stated principle and implemented deductively from it, and it is 
often derided as a compromise reached through the complicated power politics 
among various bureaucratic systems and political factions. This may be a very 
Japanese way of policy making. 
However, despite the vagueness of  these aid principles, the administration 
of Japan’s aid has consistently shown a strong, though implicit, motif. To clar- 
ify the basic motif behind Japan’s aid policy: aid should be conducive to the 
long-term economic development of recipient countries, based on Japan’s de- 
velopment experience. Although never stated explicitly, this motif of contribut- 205  Japan’s Development Cooperation and Economic Development in East Asia 
ing to the recipient’s long-term development has comprised the background 
of Japan’s policy formation and seems to have been broadly accepted among 
policymakers in the Japanese government. The government announced the 
ODA Charter in June 1992. 
8.2.2 
Teranishi 1992): 
The Relationship between ODA and Development Policy 
Four basic characteristics of Japan’s ODA have been identified (Kohama and 
1. low share of grants, 
2. emphasis on project financing, although the share of policy-based lending 
(PBL) is increasing, in cooperation with the World Bank adjustment lending, 
3. emphasis on the request principle, or the principle of extending aid on a 
request basis, and 
4.  emphasis on the self-help efforts of a recipient country. 
Needless to say, it is important to note that these characteristics stand in 
close relationship to the Japanese view of  economic development policy de- 
scribed in the previous section and, in a sense, could be regarded as logical 
consequences of it. The relationship is most apparent in the emphasis on the 
request principle. Since the degree of underdevelopment of markets and the 
accumulation of learning capability differs among countries for reasons other 
than their relative phases of development, Japan’s aid policy puts special em- 
phasis on maintaining a different approach for each recipient country. The pol- 
icy not only avoids the application of a uniform development strategy, it recom- 
mends that a recipient country devise its own methods of coping with obstacles 
to development. Consequently, emphasis on self-help constitutes another char- 
acteristic of Japan’s approach, and as for the choice of objectives of aid, the 
basic stance is passively reacting to the request emanating from the recipient’s 
own initiatives. 
In this regard, Japan’s aid is expected to support the developing countries’ 
initiatives for development and is based on the understanding that economic 
development be promoted by self-help efforts. Therefore, it is implicitly under- 
stood among technocrats in Japan that it is not desirable to force policy reforms 
by  placing conditions on the recipients of  aid money.  I am not  saying that 
policy reforms are unnecessary. But compared with forced reforms without 
substantial policy dialogue, policy reform efforts following the recipient’s own 
initiatives are much more effective in promoting economic development. 
The Japanese preference for project aid and reluctance to pursue PBL also 
reflect its views on development policy. From the viewpoint of organizational 
efficiency, project aid seems to be the most suitable instrument for the effective 
implementation of aid, since it contributes directly to the enhancement of indi- 
vidual organizations or production units, either by transferring technology or 
by breaking particular bottlenecks. 
The high share of ODA loans from Japan also merits special attention. Com- 
pared with grants, recipient countries tend not to abuse ODA loans because 206  Hirohisa Kohama 
they must be repaid in the future. From this viewpoint, the low share of grants 
in Japan’s aid is nothing to be ashamed of, but has its own positive effect in 
offsetting the shortcomings of grants. 
8.3  Economic Cooperation with East Asia and Japan’s Presence: 
Description 
8.3.1  Development Cooperation 
Japan started giving aid in the 1950s. Japan’s ODA was less than $500 mil- 
lion in the 1960s but started to increase in the 1980s. It is reported that by  1992 
Japan’s  ODA had increased to more than $11 billion (for a per capita ODA 
budget of about $100). 
The presence of Japan’s ODA in developing countries is becoming more and 
more apparent. In 1970, there were six countries for which Japan’s ODA was 
the largest among bilateral donors. In 1991, there were 31 (table 8.4).  In 1989 
Japan was the top donor for 30 developing countries. Among these 30, Japan’s 
ODA was larger than the financial flow from international organizations, ex- 
cept in the cases of Ghana, Kenya, St. Vincent, India, Nepal, and Laos. 
It is often suggested that the quality of Japan’s ODA is low. For example, 
DAC review of Japan’s ODA in 1993 stated that the terms of Japan’s ODA were 
more severe than those of other DAC member countries due to the low grant 
ratio. Indeed, Japan’s grant ratio and grant element (GE) are among the lowest 
of DAC member countries. The tied-aid ratio is also an indicator of  aid quality. 
When Japan started giving ODA loans in the late 1950s, its tied-aid ratio was 
almost 100 percent, which meant all aid money was used to import Japanese 
goods. However, the ratio of tied aid among Japanese ODA loans has declined 
remarkably and is now one of the lowest of DAC member countries. 
The geographical distribution of Japanese ODA is shown in table 8.5. The 
share of Japan’s ODA that went to Asian countries was more than 70 percent 
in the 1970s, but it decreased to 60 percent in 1990. This reflects the fact that 
Japan’s  aid is extended to those countries with which it has close economic 
relations such as trade and direct investment. 
Some economists have conducted regression analyses in order to find the 
determinants of Japan’s bilateral ODA distribution. Teranishi (1  983) investi- 
gated the determinants of Japan’s ODA distribution for 1975-79.  He found that 
this distribution bears a strong relation to Japan’s exports to and the per capita 
GNP of recipient countries. Okamoto and Yokota (1992) also empirically ana- 
lyzed the determinants of  Japan’s  bilateral ODA distribution for the period 
1975-89  with five subperiods. They found that the coefficients of Japan’s ex- 
ports to, income level of, and population of recipient countries show a statisti- 
cally significant correlation with expected signs for total ODA and grant distri- 
bution. But in the case of Japan’s ODA loan share, no estimated coefficients of 207  Japan’s Development Cooperation and Economic Development in East Asia 
Table 8.4  Countries for Which Japan’s ODA is the Largest among Bilateral 
Donations 
1970  1980  1985  1989  1990  1991 
Iran  Sierra Leone 
Kuwait  Paraguay 
Qutar  Iran 
Burma  Saudi Arabia 
Cambodia  UAE 






















































































































(6 countries)  (15 countries)  (19 countries)  (30 countries)  (28 countries)  (31 countries) 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1992,29); Government of Japan (1993,25) 
income level of recipient countries show a statistically significant correlation 
in the five subperiods. 
In order to investigate recent determinants  of Japan’s bilateral ODA distribu- 
tion, the average Japanese ODA shares to the 79 countries where data was 
available for the period 1990-92 were regressed on the following variables of 
recipient countries as they existed in 1991, in six different specifications: 
1. ODAshare = const. + aN  + bYN + cFR + dX 
2. ODA share = const. + a N + b YN + c X 
3. ODAshare = const. + aN  + bYN + cFR + dXM 208  Hirohisa Kohama 
Table 8.5  Geographical Distribution of Japan’s ODA, 1990 (net disbursement; 
million U.S. $) 
Financial  Technical 


































































Source:  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1991). 
4. ODA share = const. + a N + b YN + c XM 
5. ODA share = const. + aN  + bYN + cFR + dXM + e AD 
6. ODA share = const. + aN  + bYN + cXM + dAD 
ODA share:  Gross disbursement of Japan’s total ODA, or net disburse- 
ment of Japan’s total ODA 
N:  Population (million; 1991) 
YN:  Per capita GNP (U.S.$; 1991) 
FR:  Gross international reserves (months of import coverage; 
1991) 
X:  Japan’s exports (million U.S.$; 1991) 
XM:  Japan’s exports to and imports from the recipient country 
(million U.S.$;  1991) 
AD:  Asian dummy (Asian developing countries = 1, other de- 
veloping countries = 0) 
Shares of  Japan’s ODA categories (gross disbursement of  total ODA, net 
disbursement of total ODA; 1990-92  average) are regressed in the six specifi- 
cations shown above. Estimated results for all specifications are presented in 
tables 8.6 and 8.7. Although all estimated coefficients of  FR are not statisti- 
cally significant, other variables are significant. Income levels are all signifi- 
cantly negative, and foreign trade variables are significantly positive. Japan’s 
ODA  shares are higher for lower-income countries and for countries with 
closer foreign trade relations. All Asian dummies except for technical assis- 
tance share are significantly positive. Japan’s ODA shares to Asian developing Table 8.6  Determinants of Japan’s ODA Distribution, 19!M-92:  Gross Disbursement of Total ODA 
Population  Per capita GNP  Reserves  Exports  Exports + Imports  Asian Dummy 
Specification  Constant  (N)  (YN)  (W  (X)  (XM)  (AD)  Adjusted RZ 
~~ 
1  0.89923** 
2  0.98085* 
3  0.87732* 
4  0.96780* 
5  0.62788** 













0.0038  1 * 
(2.8485) 
















0.02728  0.00033* 



















2.27308*  0.5655 
(3.6650) 
2.24293*  0.5684 
(3.6368) 
Sources: Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of Japan (1993); World Bank (1993);  IMF (1993). 
Notes:  Japan’s ODA shares to 79 countries (1990-92 average) are regressed on the independent variables in 1991. Numbers in parentheses are ?-values. 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. Table 8.7  Determinants of Japan’s ODA Distribution, 1990-92:  Net Disbursement of Total ODA 
Population  Per capita GNP  Reserves  Exports  Exports + Imports  Asian Dummy 
(N)  (FR)  (XI  (XM)  (AD)  Adjusted R2  Specification  Constant 
1  0.8401 8** 
2  0.92590* 
3  0.82069** 
4  0.92140* 
5  0.61053*** 
6  0.75462* 
(2.4827) 
(3.6383) 




























0.02865  0.00022* 



















1.9  1505  *  0.5 169 
(3.0163) 
1.88433*  0.5201 
(2.9848) 
Sources: Ministry of  Foreign Affairs (1993); World Bank  (1993); IMF (1993). 
Notes: Japan’s ODA shares to 79 countries (1990-92  average) are regressed on the independent variables in 1991. Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 10 percent level. 211  Japan’s Development Cooperation and Economic Development in East Asia 
Table 8.8  Countries Receiving the Most Japanese Bilateral ODA, 1992 (net 
disbursement; million U.S. $) 
Country 
Technical 




















































Total  5,207.24  606.49  661.30  3,939.46 
Bilateral ODA total  8,484.23  1,732.81  2,131.50  4,619.92 
Source: Ministry of  Foreign Affairs (1993). 
countries are higher than to developing countries in the other regions when 
adjusted for the population size, income level, and foreign trade transactions. 
Major recipient countries of  Japan’s  ODA  are shown in  table  8.8.  The 
ASEAN-4 and China are the countries receiving the most Japanese bilateral 
ODA aid. When we look at the cumulative figures of Japan’s bilateral ODA 
loans up to 1991, Indonesia, India, the Philippines, China, Thailand, Korea, 
Pakistan, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Egypt are the top 10 recipient countries. 
East Asian countries such as the ASEAN-4 and China are the chief recipient 
countries of Japan’s ODA loans in terms of cumulative value. Although causal- 
ity is not clear, economic growth rates are relatively high for these 10  countries. 
The share of Japan’s ODA loans in its total bilateral ODA was 50 percent in 
1991 (Government of  Japan 1993, 42). This is much higher than the DAC 
average (1  1.7 percent). This fact is related to the first characteristic of Japan’s 
ODA mentioned in section 8.2.2. Table 8.9 shows the sectoral distribution of 
major DAC member countries. This table shows that the share of  ODA for 
economic infrastructure is quite high for Japan. 
8.3.2 
The share of ODA loans in Japan’s total ODA is much higher than the DAC 
average because Japan’s ODA is partly financed by the Fiscal Investment and 
Loans Program.’ 
The request basis principle emanates from the shortage of information about 
recipient countries and the lack of  a concrete Japanese policy design. ODA 
A Background for Aid Policy 
1. Some observers believe that Japan, by emphasizing infrastructure, presents an alternative to 
“the World BanklIMF approach.” For example, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan 
(OECF 1991) holds a skeptical view of the World Bank approach. They note four points: Table 8.9  Sectoral Distribution of ODA, 1991 (commitment; %) 
Sector 
United  United  DAC 
Japan  States  Kingdom  France  Germany  Italy  Canada  Australia  Sweden  Average 
Social infrastructure  17.5  23.0  27.2  49.0  28.3  15.4  22.2  36.1  15.6  25.7 
Economic infrastructure  31.7  4.7  22.7  20.6  25.8  26.4  12.3  19.9  22.5  19.1 
Agriculture  10.0  8.3  8.8  6.9  10.5  19.3  11.1  18.2  9.1  11.3 
Industry  8.7  6.2  4.5  10.7  20.1  19.2  7.8  5.7  10.7  9.8 
Food aid  0.6  13.2  1.5  0.9  2.9  4.4  7.0  7.3  0.2  5.9 
Program  aid  31.5  44.6  33.3  21.9  11.4  15.4  39.6  13.0  44.6  26.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1992). 213  Japan’s Development Cooperation and Economic Development in East Asia 
policy is determined through negotiation among four agencies (Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MITI, and Economic Planning Agency) 
and, by  and large, is a product of  compromise among the interests of  these 
agencies. 
When things are determined by consensus among four agencies, aid policy 
of a controversial nature is not easily realized, and instead those policies that 
everyone agrees with tend to be chosen. Thus the above-mentioned humanitar- 
ian considerations are important in ODA policy in Japan since no one could 
effectively oppose this philosophy. A quarter of Japan’s bilateral ODA is issued 
to satisfy basic human needs (BHNs) or to alleviate poverty. The policy objec- 
tive of economic development in recipient countries is likewise easily accom- 
modated. Since this is related to improving the living standards of the poor, 
there would be no effective objection to this. 
Moreover, the future of the Japanese economy depends heavily on the main- 
tenance of the free trade system and the expansion of world trade. ODA as a 
tool for expanding world trade as well as bringing about political stability in 
developing countries conforms, in this sense, with Japan’s “national interest.” 
8.3.3 
Although Japan’s  ODA policy is based on the country’s past experiences 
with economic development, new important elements are emerging, reflecting 
the rapid changes in global conditions and in the Japanese position therein. 
Two topics will be taken up below: strategic aid and environmental considera- 
tions. 
Current Issues in ODA Policy 
Strategic Aid 
There exists a movement in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the former 
ruling Liberal Democratic party (LDP) to increase the emphasis on “strategic 
considerations” in ODA. 
In a Diet debate on April 10, 1991, Toshiki Kaifu, then prime minister of 
Japan, announced the existence of ODA policy considerations relating to stra- 
tegic factors such as military expenditure in recipient countries. This is not a 
1.  Structural adjustment is not sufficient for sustainable development. It  is necessary to intro- 
2.  It is necessary to protect the domestic industry to some extent to allow a viable export indus- 
3.  It is indispensable to have development financing institutions lending with a subsidized inter- 
4. We  must carry out privatization only when adequate conditions, such as the  existence of 
duce investment promotion measures. 
try to develop. 
est rate, under some circumstances, in order to maximize the social welfare. 
well-functioning  markets, are achieved. 
However, emphasis on project financing does not imply that Japan has a well-defined alternative 
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new policy meant to replace the two basic philosophies of ODA mentioned in 
section 8.1  -humanitarian  considerations and recognition of interdependence. 
However, the following four points were new  considerations announced in 
April 1991. The Japanese government now takes the following into consider- 
ation in providing bilateral ODA: 
1. military expenditure in recipient countries, 
2. the development and production of arms in recipient countries, 
3. exports and imports of arms in recipient countries, 
4. the trend of democratization, introduction of a market-oriented economic 
system, basic human rights, and freedom in recipient countries. 
Based on these four points, the ODA Charter, adopted by  the Cabinet on 
June 30, 1992, states four principles and geographical and sectoral priorities. 
The four principles of the ODA Charter are: 
1. Environmental conservation and development should be simultaneously 
pursued. 
2. Any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international 
conflicts should be avoided. 
3. Full attention should be paid to trends of military expenditure and trade 
in arms of recipient countries for Japan’s aid giving. 
4. Full attention should be paid to efforts for democratization and introduc- 
tion of a market economy of recipient countries for Japan’s aid giving. 
Regional priorities for Asian developing countries are clearly stated in the 
ODA Charter. Five sectoral priorities are (1) environmental  problems, (2) basic 
human needs, (3) human resource development, (4) infrastructure develop- 
ment, and (5) structural adjustment. 
It is desirable to implement development aid based on an explicit policy. 
However, once the policy is announced, there should not be too many excep- 
tions. This poses interesting questions with regard to aid to China. Was resum- 
ing ODA to China consistent with the above four points? Is China not a large 
exporter of arms? Are human rights and freedom maintained in China? 
Japan’s ODA by  the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  Japan (1992, 30-34; 
1993, chap. 2) discussed the issues related to the above four points and the 
ODA Charter. It pointed out various cases where ODA was stopped due to a 
coup d’etat or other human rights violations. But nothing is mentioned about 
China. If China’s case is to be an exception, the Japanese government should 
present the reasons for the exceptional treatment of China. Without explicit 
reasoning it is difficult to understand the inconsistency between China’s situa- 
tion and resumption of Japanese aid to China. 
Environment and Development Aid 
The OECD ministerial meeting on the environment and development was 
held in December 1991, and the U.N. Conference on the Environment and 
Development (UNCED) was held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. The central 
issue was how to balance economic development and environmental protec- 
tion, in other words, how to achieve sustainable development. 215  Japan’s Development Cooperation and Economic Development in East Asia 
During the long process of economic development, people in industrialized 
countries paid little attention to environmental issues. For developing coun- 
tries, economic development is a policy of  first priority. It is hard for such 
countries to pay more attention to environmental issues, but deterioration of the 
environment in developing countries has external diseconomies for everyone. 
We should recognize the fact that industrialized countries have attained eco- 
nomic development without due  consideration to  environmental issues by 
present-day standards. Donor governments should make compensation. It is 
our view that, in order to cope with the issue of  external diseconomies, we 
should provide more aid to a recipient country which plans to pay more atten- 
tion to environmental issues in its development planning. 
8.3.4  Financial Flow to East Asia 
As is well known, in its initial phase of  industrialization Korea depended 
heavily on external financing. When Korea started its first five-year plan in 
1962, nearly 80 percent of  gross domestic fixed capital formation (GDFCF) 
was financed by external sources. Even in its third five-year plan period (1972- 
76), which marked the start of heavy industrialization in Korea, the ratio of 
foreign capital to GDFCF was still higher than 20 percent. 
Accumulated foreign borrowing in Korea was an important policy issue 
around 1980. In terms of external debt Korea was among the worst 10 in 1980. 
But nobody claims that Korea has an external debt problem now.  Due to its 
high economic growth and export expansion, Korea’s external debt in relation 
to its economic size declined sharply. This is often attributed to the shift to an 
export-oriented development strategy in Korea. In certain phases of economic 
development, developing counties often depend on external sources for fi- 
nancing investment. The crucial point of external financing is how to use for- 
eign savings efficiently. 
Financial flow to East Asian countries in 1991 is shown in Table 8.10. Panel 
A shows the absolute value of  the selected categories of  external financing, 
and Panel B compares the ratio of external financial flow to investment. 
Ratios of financial flow to investment in Hong Kong and the ASEAN-4 were 
higher than  12 percent in  1991, higher than those of  all Asian NICs, except 
Hong Kong. Dependence on official flow increased in the 1980s for East Asian 
countries. The figures in the table seem to suggest that external financing, both 
official and private, makes substantial contributions to capital accumulation 
and economic development in East Asia. 
8.4  East Asian Dynamism and Development Cooperation 
Some East Asian developing countries, such as Indonesia, China, and Viet- 
nam, are in the process of structural adjustment. Indonesia’s economy is shift- 
ing from oil-based to industry-based, by  a  series of  deregulation policies. 
China and Vietnam are in the midst of the transition from centrally planned 
economies to market economies. 216  Hirohisa Kohama 
Table 8.10  Financial Flows to East Asia, 1991 
A. Amount (million U.S. $) 
Total  Total 
Receipt  Official  Private 







































































B. Financial Flowsfinvestment Ratio (%) 
Total  Total  Current 
Receipt  Official  Private  Account 

















































































Sources: OECD, Geographical  Distribution  of  Financial Flows to Developing  Countries (Paris,  19881 
1991); IMF, International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C., April 1993); Asian Development Bank, 
Key Indicators of  Developing Member Countries of  the Asian Development Bank (Manila, 1992). 
Note: Figures are net disbursements except ODA Gross and Total Official Gross. 
East Asia is the most dynamic region in the world. By “dynamic” we mean 
that the economic growth rate and the speed of  structural change are high. 
Maintaining East Asian dynamism is crucially important not only for the East 
Asian countries themselves but also for the world economy. I believe that the 
most important factor in explaining high growth in East Asia is that they are 
very clever followers, in the sense of the catching-up product cycle. They uti- 
lize the diffusion of dynamism: from Japan to the Asian NICs, from the NICs 
to the ASEAN countries, then from the ASEAN countries to China and Viet- 217  Japan’s Development Cooperation and  Economic Development in East Asia 
nam. For China and Vietnam the shift from centrally planned economies to 
market economies and open economic policy are important to their becoming 
successful followers. They understand the mechanisms to promote develop- 
ment and the role of government. In spite of popular misunderstanding of Ja- 
pan’s industrial policy (Johnson 1982),  technocrats in East Asia understand that 
the crucial point is to utilize private dynamism. The role of government is not 
to intervene in the market directly, but to maintain a competitive economic 
environment and provide basic infrastructure. Further, in East Asia, competi- 
tion among countries is quite fierce. When one country announces a deregula- 
tion policy for foreign direct investment, neighboring countries try to deregu- 
late their foreign investment policies as well. 
Foreign direct investment played a crucial role in the diffusion of dynamism. 
Many companies from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and other more developed coun- 
tries are rushing to Thailand, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam. For example, 
many export-oriented firms have rushed into Indonesia since the start of a se- 
ries of deregulation policies in the mid-1980s. Since then, the change in the 
Indonesian export structure has been remarkable. In 1985 more than two-thirds 
of  Indonesia’s exports were oil and gas. By  1993, manufactured exports had 
increased sharply to more than 60 percent. Relatively open trade and foreign 
investment policies have become widespread in East Asian countries recently. 
However, the shortage of basic infrastructure,  such as electricity and port facil- 
ities, is a serious problem for these countries. 
Generally speaking, the contribution of  aid for economic development in 
developing countries is limited. But the contribution of aid is not so small in 
some Asian cases. Table 8.11 shows the contribution of Japan’s ODA loans to 
the selected economic infrastructure  in East Asia. For example in Thailand 20 
percent of  the total electricity supply and 29 percent of  irrigation facilities 
were financed by Japan’s ODA loans. Although it is difficult to verify the con- 
tribution of aid with a rigorous quantitative model, the figures in table 8.11 are 
very important supporting evidence in understanding the positive role of aid in 
economic development in East Asia. 
It is difficult to identify the impact of ODA, especially  bilateral ODA, on the 
economic development of recipient countries. As shown in table 8.10, official 
resources for financing investments in East Asian countries are not small. Ja- 
pan’s ODA is expanding, and Japan lays special emphasis on Asia in its ODA 
distribution, as shown in tables 8.5 and 8.8. 
Systematic development plans with well-balanced private and public invest- 
ment programs and efficient economic management are crucially important 
to  promoting  economic  development.  The  Japanese  government  impli- 
citly pledges an annual disbursement of ODA to selected developing coun- 
tries. In such cases, recipient countries can utilize Japan’s ODA money for 
infrastructure investment. With  a  sufficient  supply  of  infrastructure and 
human capital, developing countries can expect sustained economic develop- 
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Table 8.11  Contribution of Japan’s ODA Loans to Economic Infrastructure  in East 
Asia (%) 
China  Korea  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand 
Electricity  4 
Rural electrification 
Telephone  10 
Rural telephone network 
Railway  8 
Port  5 
Freeway 
Dam 





31  51  5  20 
21 
11 
12  20 





Source: OECF (1992). 
Note: Contribution of Japan’s ODA loans to total supply of infrastructure service. 
“Freeway in Bangkok. 
bPumping station for flood control in Manila. 
8.5  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I have described characteristics of Japan’s ODA. I shall sum- 
marize the major findings of the paper. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Japan’s major purpose in providing ODA was to 
promote its exports to recipient countries. However, the ratio of tied aid to total 
ODA loans from Japan has declined remarkably and has become one of the 
lowest among DAC member countries. In  1991 Japan’s untied-aid ratio (the 
ratio of untied ODA to total bilateral ODA) was 79.7 percent, the third highest 
among the 20 DAC member countries. This means that export promotion has 
become much less important to Japanese ODA policy. 
Geographically speaking, about 60 percent of Japan’s bilateral ODA is pro- 
vided  to  Asian  developing countries. This geographical priority is clearly 
stated in Japan’s ODA Charter, announced in June 1992, and is also confirmed 
by the regression analysis in section 8.3. 
The major sector of  Japanese bilateral ODA is economic infrastructure in- 
vestment. The DAC average share of economic infrastructure investment was 
less than 20 percent. However, more than 30 percent of Japan’s bilateral ODA 
was intended for this sector in 1991. 
The four basic characteristics of Japan’s ODA-the  low share of  grants, the 
emphasis on project financing, the emphasis on the request principle, and the 
emphasis on the self-help efforts of a recipient country-have  been identified. 
I have  argued that these characteristics of  ODA policy are rooted in Japan’s 
postwar development experience. 219  Japan’s Development Cooperation and Economic Development in East Asia 
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Comment  Chong-Hyun Nam 
This is an interesting paper. I enjoyed it very much and I learned a lot from it. 
At  the same time, I must say that I found it rather difficult to comment on, 
partly because it covers a wide range of  issues and partly because it develops 
arguments based on facts about Japan’s postwar experience with which I am 
not too familiar. I will, however, talk about questions and issues that I would 
liked to have seen in a paper under the same title. 
This paper gives a very good description of two major issues that are both 
important but only thinly related to each other. One concerns the development 
mechanism experienced by Japan during the postwar period, and the other con- 
cerns Japan’s development cooperation with developing nations in recent years. 
I wholly agree with Kohama that Japan has been able to achieve its high 
degree of industrialization by finding the proper mix of infant-industry protec- 
tion and import liberalization during the postwar period, an extremely difficult 
task both in theory and in practice. Flexibility in the interaction mechanism 
between the private sector and the government and a preannounced liberaliza- 
tion plan have been effective in establishing a competitive environment. 
I also agree with Kohama that developing nations are often burdened with 
underdeveloped domestic markets, lack of  organizational efficiency, and so 
forth, and hence government intervention is often called for. 
But Kohama goes one step further to claim that a competitive environment 
can be enhanced even in a protected and oligopolistic market such as postwar 
Japan’s because entrepreneurs will have a strong incentive to improve produc- 
tivity  and international competitiveness under protection. Indeed, this may 
well be true in Japan, but I doubt the same argument will hold for other devel- 
oping nations. I wonder whether one might find counterexamples even in Ja- 
pan. It seems to me Japanese entrepreneurs did their best to improve productiv- 
ity and international competitiveness whether protection was given or not. This 
might have been especially the case when protection was perceived by  entre- 
preneurs to be only a temporary measure. I hope there will be no misunder- 
standing on this point, especially in other developing nations who contemplate 
emulating Japan’s experience of import protection. In addition, I think Japan 
has become trapped by prolonged protection in agriculture, as well as in some 
service sectors such as the distribution system. 
As for the second issue, that of Japan’s development cooperation with devel- 
oping nations, Kohama presents a rather lengthy description of  the positive 
contribution of Japan’s official development assistance (ODA). No one can dis- 
pute the importance of  ODA in terms of  capital financing in developing na- 
tions. But it is also true that there are a number of issues of importance overrid- 
ing ODA in relation to Japan’s role in developing economic cooperation with 
developing nations. For example, I would liked to have seen a description of 
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the possibility of trade expansion, direct investment (including joint ventures), 
technology transfers, and the problem of leadership in the ongoing Uruguay 
Round negotiations for developing nations. But then that would be another 
paper. 
Finally, Kohama addresses Korea’s development issues in one section of the 
paper. He talks about the importance of foreign capital in financing domestic 
investment and about Korea’s trade orientation with an ultra-export bias. This 
will be discussed more in detail in my paper presented in chapter 6 of this 
volume. 
ConlIllent  John Page 
Careful analyses of the design strategies underlying bilateral aid and their pos- 
sible impact on the development strategies of recipient countries are rare. This 
is especially true in the case of  the successful East Asian economies, where 
the focus of  attention has been primarily on the roles of  domestic resource 
accumulation  and  activist  public  policies  in  explaining  their  exceptional 
growth.’ Kohama’s paper is therefore welcome on two counts. First, it repre- 
sents an attempt to explain which elements of Japan’s own development experi- 
ence had the greatest impact on the design of aid strategy. And second, it tries 
to link aid strategy to some of the origins of success in other East Asian econo- 
mies. This is an ambitious task, and while the paper does not wholly succeed, 
it provides some interesting insights into a very poorly understood aspect of 
the Asian success story, regional contagion. 
East Asia has a remarkable record of high and sustained economic growth. 
Most of this achievement is attributable to seemingly miraculous growth in 
just eight economies: Japan; the “four tigers,” Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan; and the three newly industrializing economies (NIEs) 
of Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Since 1960, these eight 
have grown more than twice as fast as the OECD and the rest of  East Asia, 
roughly three times as fast as Latin America and South Asia, and 25 times 
faster than sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1960 and 1985, real income per cap- 
ita increased more than four times in Japan and the four tigers and more than 
doubled in the Southeast Asian NIEs. If  growth were randomly distributed, 
there is roughly one chance in  10 thousand that success would have been so 
regionally concentrated. 
Relative geographical proximity is the most obvious shared characteristic of 
the successful Asian economies. East Asian economies have clearly benefited 
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from the kind of nonformal economic linkages geographic proximity encour- 
ages, including those in trade and investment flows. Despite the substantial 
development assistance flows to the region shown by Kohama, private capital 
flows dominate as a source of  investment in all of  the East Asian economies 
except Indonesia and the Philippines. Private capital flows have accelerated in 
the last decade, as northeast Asian manufacturers of  labor-intensive exports 
moved their factories south to take advantage of  lower wages. The share of 
foreign investment in total investment has increased over the decade, in con- 
trast to the share of development assistance. From the policy viewpoint, these 
linkages have been encouraged by macroeconomic stability and the generally 
liberal treatment of foreign investment. But even where foreign investment pol- 
icies have been  restrictive, informal credit and information networks have 
helped investors to move capital relatively freely. 
Kohama identifies one central factor, both as an essential principle underly- 
ing Japan’s aid strategy and as a major source of  East Asia’s dynamism. In 
Kohama’s words, “technocrats in East Asia understand that the crucial point is 
to  utilize  private  dynamism.” The  extent  to  which  the  developing, high- 
performing Asian economies (HPAEs) have succeeded in tapping this dyna- 
mism is shown in figure 8C.1, which gives private and public investment as a 
share of GDP for a sample of 47 low- and middle-income economies (LMIEs) 
(including five of the developing country HPAEs).*  Private investment is about 
7 percentage points higher in the HPAEs than in other middle-income econo- 
mies. It rose from about 15 percent of  GDP in  1970 to nearly 22 percent in 
1974, then declined and held at about 18 percent between  1975 and  1984. 
Private investment contracted sharply between 1984 and 1986 reflecting the 
global recession, then recovered by  198K3  In contrast, private investment in 
other LMIEs has remained relatively stable at about  11 percent of  GDP. In- 
deed, virtually all of the difference in investment rates between the HPAEs and 
other developing countries is due to differences in private investment. 
The central unanswered question of Kohama’s paper is, To what extent was 
the aid design and strategy of  Japan relevant to the widespread adoption of 
private investment-driven development strategies in other HPAEs? The basic 
characteristics of official development assistance (ODA) identified in the pa- 
per-low  grant share, emphasis on project financing, emphasis on the “request 
basis” for lending, and emphasis on self-help-appear  to differ little from the 
objectives expressed by many other bilateral and multilateral donors and to be 
tangentially related at best to the development of  the high levels of  private 
investment described above. The answer may lie in two seemingly unrelated 
observations in the paper: first, that Japan “not only avoids the application of 
2. The data are drawn from Pfeffemann and Madarassy (1992). 
3. This basic pattern is observed in four individual economies-Korea,  Thailand, Singapore, 
and Malaysia. The pattern  for Indonesia differs; real private investment declined continuously 
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a uniform development strategy, it recommends that a recipient country devise 
its own methods of coping with obstacles to development,” and second, that in 
the case of East Asia Japan’s ODA loans were heavily concentrated in the pro- 
vision of economic infrastructure. 
The HPAEs encouraged private investment by several means. First, they did 
a better job than most developing economies at creating infrastructure which 
was complementary to private investment. Second, they created an investment- 
friendly environment through a combination of  tax policies favoring invest- 
ment and policies that kept the relative prices of capital goods low, largely by 
avoiding the effects of high tariffs on imported capital goods. 
Third and more controversial, most HPAE governments controlled deposit 
and lending rates below market-clearing levels. Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Thai- 
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ments were able to mildly repress interest rates on deposits with a minimal 
impact on saving and pass the lower rates to final borrowers, thus subsidizing 
corporations. This transfer of income from households to firms may have in- 
creased the volume of savings. It also changed the form in which savings were 
held, from debt to corporate equity, increasing the risk-bearing capacity of the 
economy (Stiglitz 1993). Tests of  the relationship between interest rates and 
growth suggest that in the cases of  Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the negative 
relationship between  interest  rate  repression  and  growth  found  in  cross- 
economy analyses is not present (World Bank 1993). 
Finally some governments, especially in the northeastern Asian tier, spread 
private investment risks to the public.  In  some economies the government 
owned or controlled the institutions providing investment funds, in others it 
offered explicit credit guarantees, and in still others it implicitly guaranteed 
the financial viability of promoted projects. Relationship banking by a variety 
of public and private banking institutions in Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malay- 
sia, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan involved the banking sector in the man- 
agement of  troubled enterprises, increasing the likelihood of  creditor work- 
outs. Directed credit programs in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan signaled directions 
of government policy and provided implicit insurance to private banks. 
At least some of these policy initiatives, while reflecting successful Japanese 
experience, were contrary to the lending criteria of  multilateral institutions 
such as the World Bank and to those of many bilateral aid agencies. Seen in 
this light, the combination of lack of a prior model with regard to appropriate 
development policy and a focus on economic infrastructure which was comple- 
mentary to private investment led growth in the HPAEs. It is also likely that 
geography facilitated the adoption of imitative strategies, in both public and 
private-sector activity. Policy imitation-specifically  of Japan’s industrial strat- 
egy-was  an explicit objective in Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia. 
Some economists and political scientists have  argued that the East Asian 
Miracle is due to the high quality and authoritarian nature of the region’s insti- 
tutions (Johnson 1982). They describe East Asian political regimes as “devel- 
opmental states” in which powerful technocratic bureaucracies, shielded from 
political pressure, devise and implement well-honed interventions. But Ko- 
hama asserts correctly that the most broadly applied lesson of Japan’s experi- 
ence “was not the industrial policy but the dynamism of the private sector.” 
Developmental  state  models  overlook  the  central  role  of  government- 
private-sector cooperation. While leaders of the HPAEs have tended to be ei- 
ther authoritarian or paternalistic, they have also been willing to grant a voice 
and genuine authority to a technocratic elite and key elements in the private 
sector. Unlike authoritarian leaders in many other economies, leaders in the 
HPAEs realized that economic development was impossible without cooper- 
ation. 
Leaders needed institutions and mechanisms to reassure competing groups 
that each would benefit from growth. The first step was to recruit a competent 225  Japan’s Development Cooperation and Economic Development in East Asia 
and relatively honest technocratic cadre and insulate it from day-to-day politi- 
cal interference. The power of these technocracies has varied greatly. In Japan, 
Korea,  Singapore, and  Taiwan, strong, well-organized bureaucracies wield 
substantial power. Other HPAEs  have had  small, general-purpose planning 
agencies. But in each economy, economic technocrats helped leaders to devise 
a credible economic strategy. 
Leaders in the HPAEs also built a business-friendly environment. A major 
element of  that environment was a legal and regulatory structure which was 
generally hospitable to private investment, and the investment-friendly public 
policy framework outlined above. But beyond this, the HPAEs have with vary- 
ing degrees of formality and success focused on enhancing communications 
between  business and government. Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore 
have established forums, called deliberation councils. These forums have en- 
abled private-sector groups to influence the formulation and implementation 
of government policies relevant to their interests. 
In  Japan and Korea, technocrats used deliberation councils to coordinate 
behavior among firms. Because the private sector participated in drafting the 
rules and because the process was transparent to all participants, private-sector 
groups became more willing participants in the leadership’s development ef- 
forts. One byproduct of this process was a tendency to minimize private re- 
sources devoted to wasteful rent-seeking activities rather than productive en- 
deavors. Deliberation councils also facilitated information exchanges between 
the private sector and government, among firms, and between management and 
labor. The councils thus supplemented the market’s information transmission 
function, enabling firms to respond more quickly than in other economies to 
changing markets. In Malaysia the councils appear to be increasing in impor- 
tance and scope. In Thailand the formal mechanisms of communication have 
generally been used to present businesses’ positions to government and reduce 
suspicion of the private sector. 
Kohama notes that “the most important factor to explain high growth in East 
Asia is that they are very clever followers, in the sense of the catching-up prod- 
uct cycle.” Although he intends this to refer to the diffusion of technology, it 
could equally well be applied to the diffusion and adaptation of policies and 
institutions. Institutions of  business-government  communications were  un- 
doubtedly due.more to the impact of geography promoting imitation-it  is no 
accident that Prime Minister Mahatir of Malaysia calls his institution-building 
strategy “Look East”-than  a conscious product of  aid policy or institution 
building by Japan. The general model of Japanese success undoubtedly im- 
pressed policymakers throughout East Asia and provided a sense of the feasi- 
bility, as well as potential instruments, of growth. Aid policy, importantly how- 
ever, supported rather than suppressed local initiatives. 
As Japan becomes more geographically diversified in its aid program, there 
will be new challenges for ODA policy. Japan is now the largest bilateral donor 
to Africa. To  what extent can it rely on the “request principle” to guide aid 226  Hirohisa Kohama 
allocations toward appropriate economic infrastructure outside of  East Asia? 
Will policies to promote private investment work in the institutional settings of 
other developing countries? Does Japan need to play a more active role in 
institution building and development of  the private sector? Will the lessons 
of Japan’s experience diffuse adequately without the benefit of  geographical 
proximity? These are questions both Kohama and Japanese aid policy leave 
unanswered, 
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